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Silencing Chicken Little: Options for School Districts
After Parents Involved
I. INTRODUCTION

On June 28, 2007, the United States Supreme Court invalidated
the student assignment policies of two public school districts that
used race classifications to maintain pre-determined percentages of
racial groups within each school.' ParentsInvolved in Community
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 addressed consolidated
equal protection challenges to elementary and high school student
assignment plans in Seattle, Washington, and Louisville,
Kentucky.2 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts
reaffirmed that the Fourteenth Amendment requires strict scrutiny
review of all government race distinctions 3 and found that neither
district's plan was narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling
governmental interest. 4 A majority agreed that neither district
demonstrated any of the compelling interests previously
recognized by the Court, but Chief Justice Roberts wrote only for a
plurality when Justice Kennedy acknowledged additional
compelling interests asserted by the districts. 5 Justice Breyer
dissented and warned that the Court's holding set back school
integration efforts and threatened the Court's landmark 1954
decision in Brown v. Board ofEducation.7
Indeed, the dissent was not alone in its dismay. "Within an
hour of the U.S. Supreme Court's release of [its] .. .decision in
June, pundits in the news media and talk show hosts of various
political stripes were remarkably quick to bury racial integration
plans in K-12 education as a dead animal." 8 One commentator
called the Court's decision "troubling" and predicted that it would
hinder efforts to "maintain an integrated student body, prevent
resegregation, improve academic performance, and build a more
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1. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct.
2738 (2007).
2. Id.at 2746.
3. Id.at2751.
4. Id.at 2759.
5. Id.at 2752-54. Justices Roberts, Alito, Thomas, and Scalia comprised
the plurality, while Justice Kennedy joined parts of the opinion for a majority.
6. Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Stevens joined the dissent.
7. ParentsInvolved, 127 S.Ct. at 2800.
8. Maree Sneed, Desegregation Dead? Not in This Court Decision, THE
SCHOOL ADMINISTRATOR, Oct. 2007, at 1, http://www.aasa.org/publications/
saarticledetail.cfrn?ItemNumber=9426&snltemNumber=950&tnltemNumber= 1995.
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equitable and competitive America." 9 Another observer remarked
that the decision "will perpetuate-not alleviate-[the] current
separate and unequal American educational system."
Other
critics made similar statements, one going so far as to announce
that "the recent court ruling marks the return to legally sanctioned
segregation.""
Regardless of one's opinion of the decision's merits, all can
agree that Parents Involved has the potential to significantly affect
the strategies and policies of school systems across the nation,
including the seventy school districts in Louisiana. Although
Parents Involved only addresses the use of race classifications for
non-remedial purposes, 12 the decision impacts all Louisiana public
schools, whatever their desegregation status. After all, school
districts currently subject to court-ordered desegregation are
mandated to desegregate with an eye toward emerging from
judicial supervision, and these schools must be prepared to
transition smoothly to school assignment plans that pass
constitutional muster once unitary status 13 is declared. For those
Louisiana districts never under court order or declared unitary,
Parents Involved governs the constitutionality of their current
assignment plans.
9. Gary Stager, Separate But "Equal": Banning School Desegregation
Policies, DISTRICT ADMINISTRATION, Sept. 2007, at 1, http://www.district
administration.com/viewarticle.aspx?articleid=1260.
10. Id
11. Id See also id.at 2; Erwin Chemerinsky, Turning Sharply to the Right, 10
GREEN BAG 423, 428 (2007); Michael Doyle, Supreme Court Curbs Use of Race
in School Policies, MCCLATCHY WASHINGTON BUREAU, Jun. 28, 2007, available
at http://www.mcclatchydc.com/201/v-print/story/17445.html; Nicholas Lemann,
Reversals, THE NEW YORKER, Jul. 30, 2007, http://www.newyorker.com/tallcomment/2007/07/30/070730taco talk lemann; Press Release, American Civil
Liberties Union, ACLU Expresses Mixed Feelings about Supreme Court Decision
in School Desegregation Cases, (Jun. 28, 2007), http://www.aclu.org/scotus/
2006term/parentsinvolvedincommunityschoolsv.seattleschooldistrictno. Imeredith
v.jeffersoncountyboardofeducation/30302prs20070628.html; Brennan Center for
Justice, Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1,
http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/parents involved in community
schools v seattle schooldistrict nol! (last visited July 5, 2008).
12. Using explicit racial factors to remedy the effects of legal segregation
remains constitutionally acceptable. ParentsInvolved, 127 S.Ct. at 2752.
13. After Brown v. Board of Education (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 301
(1955) failed to produce desegregation with "all deliberate speed," the Court in
Green v. County School Board of New Kent County addressed specific areas in
which school districts must desegregate. 391 U.S. 430 (1968). These six areas,
identified as student assignments, faculty assignments, staff assignments,
physical facilities, transportation, and extracurricular activities, are known as the
"Green Factors" and are used by district courts to determine if a school district is
"unitary" (i.e., court-ordered desegregation is no longer necessary).
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Despite criticisms that Parents Involved marks the end of
integration efforts, this Note will demonstrate that schools need not
abandon such goals. After ParentsInvolved, public school districts
may still employ race-neutral and even race-conscious strategies to
maintain or achieve integration. 14 Part II sets forth the legal
background of racial classifications in the context of public
education, surveying the development of the Court's race
jurisprudence prior to Parents Involved. Next, Part III details the
Parents Involved decision itself, including the facts of the
consolidated cases, their procedural histories, and the reasoning
and conclusions of the Justices' opinions. 5 In Part IV, the Note
identifies how Parents Involved leaves school districts room to
employ voluntary integration policies and evaluates the viability of
race-conscious and race-neutral plans. Using Louisiana data in
particular, the Note will argue that race-neutral, disadvantagebased assignment plans are the best approach and will set forth
some general considerations for implementation.
II. SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE FROM BROWN TO PARENTS
INVOL VED

A. Desegregation
In 1954, Brown v. Board of Education
16 established the basic
unconstitutionality of de jure segregation in public elementary
and secondary education.'17 Although Brown "lifted from the Court
the burden of its history,"' 18 the short opinion provided scant legal
14. As a preliminary matter, it is fair and, indeed, intellectually honest to
acknowledge that the issue of whether integration produces positive results for
students is by no means a settled dispute. Analyzing the outcomes of school
desegregation, various sources have explored integration's negative effects on
black and white children alike. These effects do not result from innate problems
with racial mixing, but rather are due to persistent societal inequalities that make
desegregation's laudable goals difficult to achieve in practical reality. Justice
Thomas' concurrence in Parents Involved expressed concern about this very
issue, and a school district would do well to thoughtfully consider and address
potential problems when crafting integration policies. See ParentsInvolved, 127
S.Ct. at 2768 (Thomas, J., concurring).
15. The Court issued five separate opinions: a majority opinion by Chief
Justice Roberts, concurring opinions by Justices Thomas and Kennedy, and
dissenting opinions by Justices Stevens and Breyer.
16. The Latin phrase "de jure" means "based on laws or actions of the
state." MERRIAM-WEBSTER, available at http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/de%

20jure (last visited July 5, 2008).
17. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown 1), 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
18. J. HARViE WILKINSON III, FROM BROWN To BAKKE 23 (1979). That
history included decisions that explicitly and implicitly limited black freedom,
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reasoning for the Court's conclusion and little guidance for
desegregation's implementation; one year later, in Brown II, the
Court could only require that desegregation proceed with "all
deliberate speed."' 19 As one commentator remarked:
Brown thus gave little guidance to future racial debate. Its
brevity was a mask for ambiguity. If segregated schools
were not constitutional, what kinds of schools were? Was
the evil segregation itself or merely the state's imposition
of it? Was a color-blind society or the betterment of an
oppressed race the Court's chief objective? On these and
other questions, Brown (and later Brown II) gave no clear
answers. It left future problems to the future, content to
take one memorable step.2°
Over the next several decades, the Court endeavored to define
the constitutional contours of desegregation that both Brown
decisions left unanswered. Thirteen years after Brown II, the Court
addressed school desegregation again in Green v. County School
Board.2 1 Green removed the intimidating burden on blacks to
integrate under "freedom of choice ' 22 plans and instead placed an
affirmative duty upon school districts to desegregate-"to come
forward with a plan that promises realistically to work, and
promises realistically to work now. 23 Increasingly aggressive
desegregation remedies throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s
required school systems to achieve teacher racial ratios in each

including Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (sustaining "separate but
equal" accommodations); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (declaring
unconstitutional Civil Rights legislation designed to protect blacks from private
as well as public intimidation and giving blacks equal access to inns, theaters,
and transportation); The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873) (limiting the
Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges and Immunities Clause to the benefits of
federal, not state, citizenship); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856)
(holding that slaves are not United States citizens). See WILKINSON, supra, at
13-19.
19. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I1), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
20.

WILKINSON, supra note 18, at 29. See also GARY ORFIELD ET AL.,

DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION xvi (1996) ("[T]he Supreme Court in Brown,
and in the subsequent Brown II, failed to spell out . . .what successful
desegregation should look like.").
21. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
22. Id. at 431. This type of plan "allows a pupil to choose his own public
school." Id, at 431-32.
23. Id.at 439. See also ORFIELD, supra note 20, at xxii; WILKINSON, supra
note 18, at 116-17.
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school that reflected the entire district's ratio, 24 "terminate dual
school systems at once . . . operat[ing] now and hereafter only
unitary schools,, 25 and utilize involuntary busing to combat
racially segregated housing that skewed assignment plans.26 The
Court further expanded its desegregation mandate from the South
to schools in the Northern and Western United States that
intentionally maintained policies creating segregation, also noting
that Hispanics as well 27as African-Americans were entitled to a
desegregated education.
Twenty years after Brown I, however, the Court began
establishing outer boundaries for the desegregation mandate it had
so emphatically pursued against often obstinate Southern school
systems. In Milliken v. Bradley, the Court prohibited busing of
suburban students to desegregate inner city schools, absent a
finding of a constitutional violation by the suburban district.28
Then, in the early 1990s, the Court held that a district declared
unitary could return to local control and was no longer obligated to
affirmatively maintain desegregation.2 9 Moreover, districts that had
achieved some of the requirements for unitary status could be
partially released from court-ordered desegregation, 30 and the
Court announced that the primary goal of school desegregation
cases is a school system's quick return to local control. 3 '
B. Affirmative Action
Despite these later limitations, cases such as Green and Swann
v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board of Education declared and
defined school boards' duty to take "affirmative" action to
eradicate all "vestiges of state-imposed segregation." 32 If school
24. United States v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225
(1969).
25. Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969).
26. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
27. Keyes v. Denver Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
28. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
29. Bd. of Educ. of Okla. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991). See also Riddick
v. Sch. Bd. of Norfolk, 784 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1986) (the first federal court case
allowing unitary school districts to abandon desegregation plans).
30. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
31. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70(1995).
32. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971).
See also Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968) ("School
boards . . . operating state-compelled dual systems [are] nevertheless clearly
charged with the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to
convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination [will] be eliminated
root and branch.").
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districts failed to do so, the Court's desegregation cases established
that intentional state discrimination on the basis of race justified
some use of race-conscious, court-ordered remedies. 33 However,
the Court's race jurisprudence shifted in the 1970s to address
educational institutions' voluntary use of race classifications and
preferences absent findings of past purposeful discrimination. The
Court first addressed this form of "affirmative action" in Regents
of the University of Californiav. Bakke.34
1. Bakke
In Bakke, a white male applicant, denied admission to medical
school in favor of less qualified applicants, challenged the
university's admission program that separately evaluated minority
applicants for a reserved number of seats. 35 The Court's judgment
ultimately invalidated the medical school's admissions program
and ordered Allen Bakke's admission, but this result did not
invalidate affirmative action.
In essence, the affirmative action debate culminating in Bakke
resulted from the questions unanswered by Brown. "To the
university, Brown stood for minority educational opportunity...
[t]o others, Brown stood for the ideal of color blindness... Bakke
attempted, at least, to bridge the unbridgeable: the disparate
legacies of Brown.' '3 6 The "disparate legacies of Brown" are
apparent in the conflicting views of the Bakke dissenters and
Justice Powell, whose lone substantive opinion 3prevailed simply
because four Justices concurred in the judgment. For Powell, the
33. School systems' motivation to take such "affirmative action" was
spurred by the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 252 (1964)
(codified in sections of 42 U.S.C.). This act prohibited racial discrimination and
authorized the removal of federal funding from non-compliant school districts.
See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, BECOMING LESS SEPARATE? SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION, JUSTICE DEPARTMENT ENFORCEMENT, AND THE PURSUIT OF

UNITARY STATUS 6 (2007). See also WILKINSON, supra note 18, at 78.
34. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). In a case prior to Bakke, the Court did not reach
the merits of a challenge to a law school admissions program. See Defunis v.
Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974). However, one Justice writing separately
expressed strong disfavor of racial factors in admissions, even for "benign"
purposes designed to include minorities. See id at 333. Justice Douglas argued
that the Fourteenth Amendment required racially neutral consideration of
applicants. Id.at 344.
35. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 272-74 (1978).
36. WILKINSON, supra note 18, at 299.
37. Bakke did not produce a majority opinion. Four Justices did not reach the
constitutional issue, holding that Allen Bakke was excluded from medical school
in violation of federal statutory law; these Justices concurred only in Powell's
judgment insofar as it required Bakke's admittance. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 265.
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Fourteenth Amendment enunciated a personal right to equality for
all persons, despite its historical origin as a tool to prohibit
discrimination against African-Americans. Thus, though the
medical school's preference plan sought to include minorities and
only burdened non-minority applicants, its race-based admissions
program was still subject to the strictest judicial review and had to
be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government
interest.38 By contrast, the dissent advocated more lenient scrutiny
for "benign"
39 race classifications: namely, those designed to include
minorities.

Yet despite his strict view of race-conscious preference
programs, Justice Powell preserved the future viability of
affirmative action. First, he offered a "healing gesture"" by
recognizing student body diversity as a compelling interest
justifying affirmative action plans in the university setting. 41 For
Powell, "the atmosphere of 'speculation, experiment, and
creation'-so essential to the quality of higher education-[was]
widely believed to be promoted by a diverse student body, ' 2 and a
university's academic freedom under the First Amendment
encompassed student body selection.43 Next, Powell explained that
universities could indeed employ race in their admissions
programs, as long as race was not used in a quota system but was

Another four Justices concurred in part and dissented in part, arguing that the
Constitution permitted benign, non-stigmatizing race-conscious measures to
overcome past societal discrimination, even when this compensatory act is
performed by a state entity free from acts of past discrimination. Id.at 362-64.
38. Id.at 291-94. In support of this view, Justice Powell noted that the
concepts of majority and minority are temporary and subject to demographic
change, many ethnic groups other than African-Americans may claim historical
discrimination in the United States, and preferences by nature sometimes unduly
burden individuals and promote stereotypes that certain groups cannot achieve
success without aid. Id. at 295-98.
39. Id.at 361-62. Justice Brennan suggested searching review that rejected
stigmatizing classifications and demanded an "important and articulated
purpose." Id.
40. WILKINSON, supra note 18, at 303.
41. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-12. The four dissenting Justices argued that
remedying general societal discrimination is a sufficiently compelling interest.
Id. at 362-64. Justice Powell rejected this argument; referring to the
desegregation cases, he noted that the Court only allowed race-conscious
remedies to correct discrimination upon specific judicial, legislative, or
administrative findings of constitutional or statutory violations. Id.at 300-01.
42. Id.at 312 (quoting William G. Bowen, Admissions and the Relevance of
Race, PRINCETON ALUMNI WEEKLY, Sept. 26, 1977, at 7, 9).
43. Id.
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merely a "plus" factor in the consideration of an applicant. 44 Thus,
through Powell's opinion, the Bakke Court managed to "avoid a
regarding the blanket legitimacy or
conclusive outcome
illegitimacy of affirmative action.
2. Grutter and Gratz
While the absence of a true Court majority produced
uncertainty regarding Bakke's value as precedent, at the very least
affirmative action in higher education was not foreclosed.46
However, the Court soon followed Bakke with invalidation of
voluntary racial preferences in contracting, employment, and
electoral districting cases, 47 causing concern that the Court's
purported strict scrutiny of race classifications might be "strict in
theory, yet fatal in fact. '48 What would be the fate of educational
affirmative action?
Twenty-five years after Bakke, the contrasting companion
cases Grutter v. Bollinger49 and Gratz v. Bollinger50 confirmed that
limited use of racial preferences was permissible. Demonstrating
that properly tailored affirmative action plans in higher education
could survive strict review, the Court sustained the University of
Michigan Law School's race-conscious admissions program in
Grutter. There, a white female was denied entry to law school and
subsequently challenged the law school's admissions policy that
sought to enroll a "critical mass"--not a specified number or
percentage-of minority students in an effort to achieve diversity's
educational benefits. 5 To that end, the law school engaged in a

44. Id. at 315-18. By contrast, singular focus on race quotas would inhibit
genuine diversity and insulate some candidates from competition with others. Id.
Anticipating the argument that consideration of race as only one factor is merely
a more sophisticated way of according racial preference, Justice Powell
emphasized that the University's good faith would be presumed in a facially
non-discriminatory admissions policy. Id. at 318-19.
45. WILKINSON, supra note 18, at 298.
46. See id. at 306.
47. See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993); Richmond v.
J.A. Croson, Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476
U.S. 267 (1986).
48. Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection,86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8
(1972).
49. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
50. 539 U.S. 234 (2003).
51. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 314-17.
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full-file review of each applicant, where race was one
consideration among several.52
Justice O'Connor wrote for the five Justices in the majority,
reiterating Justice Powell's view that the Court must strictly
scrutinize all government use of race, whether benign or invidious
in purpose.53 Yet, she was careful to emphasize the importance of
"context" in strict, not necessarily fatal, judicial review of
affirmative action. 54 Moreover, Justice O'Connor affirmed Justice
Powell's proposition, criticized by some lower courts after
Bakke, 55 that a university's interest in student body diversity could
justify affirmative action.56 Justice O'Connor even expanded
Bakke's rationale for a diversity interest, acknowledging the First
Amendment concerns unique to higher education but pointing to
broader benefits such as "cross-racial understanding, '' 5587
"prepar[ation] [of] students for [the] workforce and society,
"effective participation ... in the civic life of [the] Nation,"59" and
skill development through "exosure
to widely diverse people,
''
cultures, ideas, and viewpoints. V1
Though the Court broadened Bakke's bases justifying a
diversity interest, Justice O'Connor tightened Bakke's "plus" factor
requirement. Specifically, the Court would permit the voluntary
use of race for diversity purposes only when the university
conducts "individual, holistic review"61 of awplicants that considers
non-racial factors contributing to diversity, gives "serious good
63
faith consideration to workable race-neutral alternative" plans,
places no undue burden on non-minorities, 64 and limits the time
race classifications are employed.65
52. Id. at 315.
53. Id. at 326.
54. Id. at 326-27.
55. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996). See also Saverio
Cereste, Minority Inclusion Without Race-Based Affirmative Action: An
Embodiment of Justice Powell's Vision, 18 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 577
(2002).
56. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328.
57. Id. at 330 (quoting Appendix to Petition for Writ of Cert. at 246a, id.
(No. 02-241)).
58. Id. (quoting Brief for Am. Educ. Research Ass'n as Amici Curiae at 3,
id. (No. 02-241)).
59. Id. at 332.
60. Id. at 330 (citing Brief for 3M as Amici Curiae at 5, id. (No. 02-241)).
61. Id. at 337.
62. Id. at 337-38.
63. Id. at 339-40.
64. Id. at 341.
65. Id. at 342 ("This [durational] requirement reflects that racial
classifications, however compelling their goals, are potentially so dangerous that
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In finding that the law school's admissions plan met these
requirements, Justice O'Connor's opinion solidified a Court
majority's tolerance of some race-based affirmative action in
higher education. However, the dissenting Justices and other
commentators viewed Grutter as a departure from Bakke
principles, calling the University's critical mass policy a "sham"
for racial quotas and a "veil to cover up ... racial balancing"67
and also criticizing the deference given the university as
uncharacteristic of strict judicial review. 8 Even so, the Court had
not grown entirely permissive toward affirmative action, for it
issued Gratz v. Bollinger69 on the same day as Grutter and struck
down the University of Michigan's race-based undergraduate
admissions program. Unlike Grutter, the plan in Gratz was not
narrowly drawn to achieve diversity; rather than using race as a
"plus" factor in a full-file review of an applicant, the university
automatically distributed to minorities one-fifth of the points
needed to guarantee admission.70 Thus, the differing results of
Grutter and Gratz confirmed that affirmative action was not
constitutionally prohibited but cautioned that even such "benign"
race discrimination must satisfy the strictest standards under the
Equal Protection Clause.
III. PARENTS INVOLVED

Bakke, Grutter, and Gratz delineated the bounds of voluntary
racial preferences in higher education, but the Court had not
determined if and how public elementary and secondary schools
might constitutionally employ affirmative action. The Court had
delved extensively into the area of court-ordered desegregation,
where racial preferences were not only permissible but often

they may be employed no more broadly than the interest demands .... [This
requirement] can be met by sunset provisions in race-conscious admissions
policies and periodic reviews to determine whether racial preferences are still
necessary.").
66. See id. at 347 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See
also id. at 389 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
67. Lauren Arms, It's Not All Black and White: Race-Based Admissions
Purport to Achieve a CriticalMass of Diversity, But in Reality Really Mask a
Pre-DeterminedQuotafor the Ideal IntegratedSociety, 49 S. TEX. L. REv. 221
(2007). See also Grutter,539 U.S. at 379 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
68. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 364 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); id. at 380 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); id. at 388 (Kennedy,
J., dissenting).
69. 539 U.S. 234 (2003).
70. Id. at 270.
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required of school districts to end de jure segregation. Inevitably
though-indeed, hopefully-school districts would one day
emerge from judicial supervision, and courts would be confronted
with racial preference programs in a non-remedial, K-12 setting.
Such was the case in Seattle, Washington, and Jefferson County,
Kentucky, the sites of the student assignment plans challenged in
ParentsInvolved.
A. Seattle
In 1998, Seattle School District No. 1 implemented a policy
allowing entering ninth grade students to rank their preferences
among the district's ten high schools. 71 If a school became
oversubscribed (i.e., too many students ranked it as their first
choice), the district employed four tiebreakers to determine which
students would fill the school's open spots. Those tiebreakers, in
order of use, included: 1) whether the student had a sibling
attending the school; 2) whether the student's race would help
balance an "integration positive" school; 3) the geographic
proximity of the school to the student's residence; and 4) a lottery
(to which the district seldom resorted). For purposes of the racial
tiebreaker, a school was deemed "integration positive" if it
deviated beyond ten percentage points from the district's overall
white to non-white racial balance; accordingly, students were
classified as "white" or "non-white" so the district could make
assignments bringing the school closer to balance.73 Notably,
Seattle never operated under court-ordered desegregation as a
result of de jure segregation, 74 but the district did experience de
facto75 segregation.

71. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct.
2738, 2747 (2007).
72. Id.
73. Id. Seattle's student population was actually more diverse than its twotiered classification, consisting of 41% Caucasian, 23.8% Asian-American,
23.1% African-American, 10.3% Latino, and 2.8% Native American students.
Id. at 2747 n.2.
74. Id.
75. "De facto" in Latin literally means "from the fact," or "in reality."
MERRIAM-WEBSTER, available at http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/de%20facto
(last visited July 5, 2008). In legal and educational parlance it is used to describe
school segregation resulting from segregated housing patterns rather than school
district policy. Nevertheless, the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People (NAACP) named Seattle in two lawsuits in the late 1960s and
1970s on grounds that the district's policies created or perpetuated segregation.
ParentsInvolved, 127 S. Ct. at 2804.
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When Seattle's use of the race tiebreaker denied some white
students their choice of schools, the students' parents challenged
the program as violating the Fourteenth Amendment Equal
Protection Clause. 76 The district court applied strict scrutiny and
upheld Seattle's plan.77 After two reversals and certification of a
state law question to the Washington Supreme Court, an en banc
panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling.78
B. Jefferson County
Across the country in metropolitan Louisville, Jefferson
County Public Schools (JCPS) was subject to court-ordered
desegregation from 1973 to 2000, when the district was declared
unitary. In 2001, JCPS adopted a student assignment plan
requiring all non-magnet schools to maintain black enrollment
between 15% and 50%. 80 For this purpose, the district classified
students as "black" or "other." 81 Initially, JCPS designated 82a
"resides" school for each student by geographic residence.
Elementary resides schools were grouped into clusters, 83 and each
student was then assigned to a school within his or her cluster on
the basis of available space and the impact of his or her race on the
school's racial balance. 84 Though high school freshmen could
apply to any school under open enrollment and any student could
76. The Seattle challenge arose from the complaints of the non-profit group
Parents Involved in Community Schools, typified by a mother who sought to
enroll her learning-disabled son in one particular high school due to a special
program it provided. Although her son was selected for the program, he was
denied admission to the school because that school was oversubscribed, the
school's white enrollment was greater than ten percent above the district's white
population on the whole, and her son's race was white. The other parents
comprising the group also had children who were denied school assignments on
the basis of race or who faced that possibility. ParentsInvolved, 127 S.Ct at
2748.
77. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 137 F.
Supp. 2d 1224 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
78. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 426 F.3d
1162 (9th Cir. 2005).
79. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct.
2738, 2749 (2007).
80. Id.
81. McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 840 n.6
(W.D. Ky. 2004). Unlike Seattle, Jefferson County's student population largely
consisted of only two racial groups: 34% of the students were AfricanAmerican, and 66% were Caucasian. ParentsInvolved, 127 S. Ct. at 2749.
82. ParentsInvolved, 127 S.Ct. at 2749.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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request a transfer to another non-magnet school, 85 applications and
could also be rejected due to space or racial
transfer requests
86
concerns.
Several parents of white students who were denied their school
choice or transfer requests challenged the district's assignment
program in McFarlandv. Jefferson County Public Schools. 7 Like
the Seattle case, the district court applied strict scrutiny and upheld
the JCPS plan.88 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed without
its
issuing a detailed written opinion and simply expressed
89
satisfaction with the district court's written reasoning.
C. The Supreme Court Opinion
The U.S. Supreme Court granted writs of certiorari in both the
Seattle and Jefferson County cases and consolidated the cases for
hearing. 9° Though the ParentsInvolved decision struck down both
districts' student assignment plans on Equal Protection grounds,
the Court was narrowly divided as to whether strict scrutiny review
should apply and, if so, whether the school districts' plans were
narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest.
1. Strict Scrutiny Review
Adhering to Bakke and Grutter, the Parents Involved majority
affirmed that strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard of judicial
review "when the government distributes burdens or benefits on
the basis of individual race classifications,, 91 since "racial
85. McFarland,330 F. Supp. 2d at 844.
86. ParentsInvolved, 127 S. Ct at 2750.
87. 330 F. Supp. 2d 834 (W.D. Ky. 2004). Four parents filed suit, but the
Supreme Court focused upon the complaint of Crystal Meredith, the only claim
left unresolved. Though the "resides" school for Meredith's kindergartener was
very close to his home, the district assigned him to another elementary within
his cluster. This school was ten miles from home and the district refused the
mother's request to allow the child to transfer to yet another, closer school
within his cluster. Although space was available at the requested school, the
child's race would have negatively affected the racial balance at that school.
ParentsInvolved, 127 S. Ct. at 2750.
88. McFarland,330 F. Supp. 2d at 837.
89. McFarland ex. rel McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 416 F.3d
513 (6th Cir. 2005).
90. See Meredith v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 126 S. Ct. 2351 (2006);
Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 126 S. Ct. 2351
(2006).
91. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2751-52 (citing Johnson v. California,
543 U.S. 499, 505-06 (2005); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003);
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995)).
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classifications are simply too pernicious to permit any but the most
exact connection between justification and classification."9 2 Like
the Bakke dissenters however, Justice Breyer argued that inclusive
race classifications 91 should be subject to a more lenient standard
than measures designed to exclude-a "contextual" 94 and
"careful" 95 review.96
In response, Chief Justice Roberts cautioned that the Court
should not presume to distinguish between good and bad uses of
race discrimination, especially when such characterizations ma
easily fluctuate from one generation's opinions to the next.
Moreover, since the Fourteenth Amendment protects persons and
not groups, no goal of assimilating a particular racial group can
validate infringement of individual rights under the Equal
98
Protection Clause without a showing that passes strict scrutiny.
Justices Thomas and Kennedy separately concurred, with Justice
Thomas noting that the Constitution draws no distinction between
invidious and "benign" race classifications 99 and Justice Kennedy
stressing the100 "presumptive invalidity" of all government race
distinctions.
With five Justices in firm agreement as to the strict standard of
review, Chief Justice Roberts proceeded to analyze whether Seattle
and Jefferson County had asserted compelling interests justifying
their affirmative action plans and whether those plans were
narrowly tailored to achieve such compelling interests.1° 1 Despite
his reservations, Justice Breyer also agreed to apply strict scrutiny
in his analysis, 02 though Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
92. Id. at 2752 (citing Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003)).
93. In Justice Breyer's view, the districts' student assignment plans sought
to bring the races together, not to allocate limited resources normally distributed
on merit-based grounds, stigmatize, exclude, exacerbate racial tensions, or
unfairly burden one race alone. Id. at 2817-18.
94. Id. at 2819.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 2815. In Justice Breyer's opinion, the Fourteenth Amendment's
purpose was to prohibit the exclusion of the slave race; consequently, using
race-conscious criteria to separate the races is distinct from using those
classifications to bring the races together.
97. Id. at 2764-65.
98. Id. at 2765. The plurality emphasized that even Brown itself addressed
the plaintiffs' individual interest in school admission. Id.
99. Id. at 2774. Regardless, Justice Thomas argued that the districts'
programs were not benign; in fact, some schoolchildren were excluded from
their school of choice and suffered injury solely on the basis of their race, no
doubt fostering racial tensions and resentment. Id. at 2775.
100. Id.at 2794.
101. Id.at 2752.
102. Id.at 2820.
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Thomas and Kennedy each criticized the dissent's version of strict
10 3
scrutiny as uncharacteristically deferential to the school districts.
2. Compelling Interests
Analyzing the first prong of the strict scrutiny analysis, the
majority found that neither Seattle nor Jefferson County had an
interest in remedying past intentional segregation-the interest
justifying race distinctions in court-ordered desegregation planssince Seattle was never legally segregated and Jefferson County
had achieved unitary status. 10 4 By contrast, the dissent would not
require a finding of de jure segregation before the districts could
have a compelling remedial interest. 10 5 Justice Breyer argued that a
school district is permitted to use race classifications to remedy de
facto segregation reflecting "generalized societal discrimination
and residential housing patterns."' 1 6 But Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Thomas and Kennedy separately stressed the importance
of the Court's traditional differentiation between de jure and de
facto segregation, noting that the distinction served to limit the
judiciary and state actors' power to fashion remedies using
disfavored race classifications. 0 7 They also emphasized that de
jure segregation is an identifiable problem capable of discrete
remedy, but de facto segregation-also referred to as racial
and
imbalance or general societal discrimination-naturally
08
1
time.
of
period
indefinite
an
over
changes
continuously
103. See id. at 2766; id. at 2775 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 2793
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
104. Id.at 2752.
105. Id.at 2810.
106. Id. at 2802.
107. Id. at 2761 (citing Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 495-96 (1992)
("Where resegregation is a product not of state action but of private choices, it
does not have constitutional implications.")); id.at 2796 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) ("Reduction of an individual to an assigned racial identity for
differential treatment is among the most pernicious actions our government can
undertake ... the distinction serves as a limit on the exercise of a power that
reaches to the very verge of constitutional authority.); id.at 2771 (Thomas, J.,
concurring) ("[W]ithout a history of state-enforced racial separation, a school
district has no affirmative legal obligation to take race-based remedial
measures."). In Justice Thomas' view, dejure segregation is a narrow exception
to the disfavor of race classifications, which explains why a race-conscious
student assignment plan is constitutional while a school is under court order for
official segregation, yet unconstitutional upon a declaration of unitary status. Id.
at 2772 n.8.
108. Id.at 2773 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("Unlike dejure segregation, there
is no ultimate remedy for racial imbalance .... [R]acial balancing will have to
take place on an indefinite basis-a continuous process with no identifiable
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After finding no interest in remedying past intentional
discrimination, the majority also deemed the Bakke-Grutter
10 9
diversity interest inapplicable to Seattle and Jefferson County
and devoted its discussion in large part to demonstrating that the
school districts' programs did not meet Grutter's requirements for
a diversity-oriented plan." 0 But the majority ultimately dismissed
the Grutter diversity interest in the K-12 context altogether, noting
that the Grutter opinion founded its broad student body diversity
interest in the unique freedoms of expression characteristic of the
university setting.ni Justice Breyer disagreed again, arguing that
the more general benefits of diversity articulated in Grutter are
even more compelling in the elementary and secondary school
context. 112 In response to the dissent's charge that the majority had
implicitly overruled Grutter,13 the Court countered that the
districts' plans violated Grutter's explicit rejection of racial
balancing as a compelling interest and any singular focus on race
as a narrowly tailored way to achieve diversity.
Though the majority rejected the application of Grutter's
interest in broad diversity, the districts also asserted an interest in a
more specific type of diversity. Seattle and Jefferson County
argued that their race-conscious assignment plans were justified by
an interest in the educational and social benefits derived from a
racially diverse learning environment,' 15 an interest which the

culpable party and no discernable end point."); id. at 2795 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (quoting Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 505-06
(1989) ("To accept [a] claim that past societal discrimination alone can serve as
the basis for rigid racial preferences would be to open the door to competing
claims for remedial relief for every disadvantaged group. The dream of a Nation
...where race is irrelevant... would be lost in a mosaic of shifting preferences
based on inherently unmeasurable claims of past wrongs.")).
109. Id.at 2754.
110. For example, the Bakke-Grutter notion of diversity required
considerations of non-racial factors in order to distinguish the diversity interest
from pure racial balancing. Id.at 2753. The Court pointed out that, though the
district's plans considered student choice and residence, when race was used it
alone was determinative of a student's assignment in a "non-individualized,
mechanical way." Id. at 2753-54. Plus, the districts' two-tiered race
classifications, white/non-white and black/other, actually undermined broad
student body diversity. Id.at 2754.
111. Id.at 2754.
112. Id.at 2822.
113. Id.at 2835.
114. Id. at 2763.
115. Id.at 2755.
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dissenting Justices wholeheartedly endorsed. 1 6 Yet, Chief Justice
Roberts chose not to decide whether the benefits of racial diversity
are sufficiently compelling to justify a race-conscious assignment
plan. He noted, "The parties ... dispute whether racial diversity in
schools in fact has a marked impact on test scores and other
objective yardsticks or achieves intangible socialization benefits.
The debate is not one we need to resolve .... ,,1 7 Instead, Chief
Justice Roberts concluded that
1 18 the student assignment plans failed
on narrow tailoring grounds.
Thus, the Parents Involved decision leaves open a question of
key significance: Do school districts have a compelling interest in
the benefits of racial diversity that, if supported by a narrowly
tailored student assignment plan, would constitutionally justify a
race-conscious assignment policy? The plurality's answer is
uncertain, but the disinclination to race-consciousness that
pervades the plurality opinion may imply hesitancy to recognize a
racial diversity interest as compelling. Moreover, Justice Scalia's
dissent in Grutter demonstrates that he is skeptical of the purported
benefits of racial diversity and any unique relevance those benefits
may have to the educational setting.1r9 For Justice Thomas, the
answer is clearly no. His Parents Involved concurrence expressed
doubt that positive educational benefits necessarily flow from a
racially integrated education, but argued nonetheless that such a
issue could hardly be classified as a
disputed social science
2
compelling interest.1 0
On the other hand, Justice Kennedy's answer is clearly yes. In
his ParentsInvolved concurrence, he departed from the plurality's
refusal to "acknowledge that the school districts have identified a
compelling interest . . . in increasing diversity, including for the
purpose of avoiding racial isolation.' 21 Seattle and Jefferson
116. Id. at 2820. The dissent's view of a racial diversity interest was broad,
encompassing an "interest in setting right the consequences of prior conditions
of segregation ... overcoming the adverse educational effects produced by and
associated with highly segregated schools ... [and an] interest in producing an
educational environment that reflects the pluralistic society in which our
children will live." Id. at 2820-21.
117. Id. at 2755.
118. Id.
119. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 347-48 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
120. ParentsInvolved, 127 S. Ct. at 2776-77. Justice Thomas cited various
studies and amicus reports indicating that African-American children do not
benefit academically or socially from racial mixing in an educational setting and
then noted that reports showing positive integration benefits are unspecific and
unable to precisely show what demographics create such effects. Id.
121. Id. at 2789 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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County lost Justice Kennedy's key swing vote, not as to whether
the districts had a compelling interest justifying a race-conscious
assignment plan, but instead on the second prong of strict scrutiny:
narrow tailoring.
3. Narrow Tailoring
While the Roberts opinion did not resolve whether racial
diversity constitutes a compelling interest, the majority did agree
that the districts' assignment plans were not narrowly tailored to
achieve any such interest. First, the majority found that the racial
classifications used by both districts affected so few student
assignments that the effects could not justify subjecting the entire
student population to race discrimination. 2 2 Also, the
23
classifications were clearly unnecessary to achieve diversity.
Second, the Court stated that the districts violated Grutter'snarrow
tailoring requirements by failing to Aive good faith consideration to
workable, race-neutral alternatives. 4
Even within the majority, though, the Justices provided varying
explanations of the districts' failure to narrowly tailor their plans to
achieve racial diversity. Speaking only for a plurality, Chief Justice
Roberts pointed to a total lack of evidence that the alleged
educational and social benefits of racial diversity necessitated the
target minority percentages established by each district for its
schools. Instead, the plans were simply desi2ed to reflect each
Moreover, the
district's overall population demographics.
plurality maintained that diversity could be achieved without using
racial classifications, calculating the breakdowns of racial
composition within each Seattle school both with and without the
use of racial preferences and concluding that significant
122. Id. at 2759-60.
123. Id. at 2760 ("[R]acial proportionality is not required [to achieve
integration].").
124. Id. at 2759-60. However, the dissent was satisfied that the districts'
plans were narrowly tailored and questioned the majority's inability to point to a
plan less race-conscious yet still capable of achieving the districts' goals. Justice
Breyer also noted that the districts had already tried many alternatives. Further,
the dissent emphasized that the districts' plans were not quotas but only broad
outer ranges of minority populations, the focus of the plans was primarily
student choice, the criteria often had no effect on student assignments, the plans
were less burdensome than previous Court-approved plans, and the plans
reflected a thoughtful process that diminished the use of race. Moreover,
Grutter's individualized holistic review of each applicant should not be a narrow
tailoring requirement in a non-merit based elementary/secondary school
placement context. Id. at 2825-28.
125. Id. at 2755-56.
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Seattle's racial groups was achieved
representation from each of 26
1
tiebreaker.
racial
the
without
Writing separately, Justice Kennedy emphasized that Jefferson
County had not explained how and when it employs race
classifications with enough precision to survive strict scrutiny, and
Seattle's major flaw was its inexplicable use of a white to nonwhite classification in a district comprised of a diversity of
races.12 7 Justice Kennedy asserted that school authorities can
counter "the status quo of racial isolation in schools"' 128 using race129
conscious measures, so long as the use of race is not a "crude"'
school system
form of "systematic, individual typing"' 30 and the
3
'
method.1
chosen
its
of
necessity
the
demonstrates
IV. THE SKY Is NOT FALLING

Unlike the law school's policy in Grutter, the race-based
assignment methods of Seattle and Jefferson County did not survive
the Court's strict review of suspect race classifications under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Decrying this result, Justice Breyer claimed
that the ParentsInvolved decision "undermines Brown s promise of
But while the
integrated primary and secondary education ....1,32
Court rejected the plans at issue, ParentsInvolved is not the end of
integration. Both race-conscious and race-neutral assignment plans
are still viable options for a district seeking to foster racial diversity
within its schools.
A. Parents Involved Does Not ForecloseRace-Conscious
Assignment Plans:RacialDiversity as a CompellingInterest
Parents Involved does not prohibit all use of race in student
assignment plans. Seattle and Jefferson County's particular raceconscious means failed narrow tailoring analysis, but the Parents
Involved plurality sidestepped rather than rejected the districts'
asserted interest in the benefits of racial diversity.' While two
126. Id.at 2756-57 n.13.

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id.
at 2789-91 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
at 2791.
Id.
at 2792.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
at 2800 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

133. Id. at 2755. Arguably, Brown itself assumed that integration produced
benefits. Chief Justice Warren noted that "segregation with the sanction of law
... has a tendency to retard the educational and mental development of Negro
children and deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive in a
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members of the plurality-Justices Thomas and Scalia-are
candidly skeptical that such benefits are compelling enough to
justify race classifications, 134 Justice Kennedy and the four Parents
Involved dissenters clearly support elementary and secondary
schools' interest in racial diversity.135 Thus, after ParentsInvolved,
a majority of the Court acknowledges a compelling interest that
will support race-conscious K-12 student assignment plans, so the
plurality's answer to the question it omitted is immaterial.
Justice Kennedy's departure from the plurality not only
ensured that school districts have a compelling interest justifying
race-conscious plans, but his concurrence also provided helpful
guidance for narrowly tailoring those plans. Justice Kennedy and
the Parents Involved plurality agreed that Seattle and Jefferson
County's plans were not narrowly tailored to achieve racial
diversity, so a school district asserting that interest must still
convince Justice Kennedy that its assignment plan is narrowly
drawn. But unlike the plurality, which did not suggest any
examples of properly drawn plans, Justice Kennedy specifically
proposed race-conscious measures that would not involve
"classify[ing] every student on the basis of race and... assi g[ing]
each of them to schools based on that classification." 13 These
measures included race-conscious school site selection zoning,
resource allotment, recruitment of faculty and students,13 or even
"a more nuanced, individual evaluation of school needs and
138
student characteristics that might include race as a component.'
This last approach "would be informed by Grutter, though ...the
criteria relevant to student placement would differ based on the age
of the students, the needs of the parents, and the role of the
schools."'139 Marked by these suggestions for properly tailoring
race-conscious policies and Justice Kennedy's vote in favor of

racially integrated system." Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954)
(quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 98 F. Supp. 797 (D. Kan. 1951)).
134. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2776-77 (Thomas, J., concurring);
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 347-48 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
135. ParentsInvolved, 127 S. Ct at 2820-23 (Breyer, J., dissenting); id. at
2789, 2797 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
136. Id.at 2792 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting "[w]hat the government is
not permitted to do").
137. Id.According to Justice Kennedy, these methods would probably not be
subject to strict scrutiny since they "do not lead to different treatment based on a
classification that tells each student he or she is to be defined by race . . . ." Id.
(citing Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 958 (1996)).
138. Id.at 2793.
139. Id.
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racial diversity as a compelling interest, ParentsInvolved reveals a
Court willing to accept the use of race in K-12 affirmative action
plans.
B. Parents Involved EncouragesRace-NeutralApproaches: The
Advantage of Disadvantage
Parents Involved does not prohibit school districts' narrowly
tailored use of race to achieve racial diversity, but even if the
opinion had stripped schools of all race-conscious student
assignment plans, options to achieve integration would remain.
Like race-conscious approaches, race-neutral student assignment
plans can also accomplish racial integration but are preferable for
several reasons. First, a race-neutral policy is the best way to
secure the full support of the Court, for it would comport with the
plurality's view that "[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis
of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race."1 40 Second, if
a school district declines to use suspect classifications such as race,
its student assignment plan will be subject to the Court's more
lenient rational basis review rather than strict scrutiny. 14 ' Third,
race-neutral means also reduce the threat of litigation against
school districts wary of further legal embroilment after years of
court-ordered desegregation. Finally, race-neutral, disadvantagebased student assignment plans can ensure that truly disadvantaged
individuals have access to the best educational resources available
and naturally achieve racial integration as well. This last benefit is
the primary topic for the remainder of this Note.
1. DisadvantageBetter Measures the Needfor Equal
Protection
Anti-discrimination measures such as the Fourteenth
Amendment, Civil Rights legislation, and desegregation orders
were necessary to combat the negative effects of oppression
resulting from a particular group's history, not to compensate for
innate inferiorities associated with skin color. 142 In his 1942 book,
140.
141.
means
142.

Id.at 2768.
A district whose race-neutral plan is challenged need only demonstrate
rationally related to a legitimate governmental end.
See 1 GEORGE BROWN TINDALL & DAvID EMORY SHI, AMERICA: A

NARRATIVE HISTORY

605-6 (W.W. Norton & Co., Inc. 5th ed. 2000) (1984)

(explaining that the Fourteenth Amendment was recommended to support the
Civil Rights Act of 1866, which in turn was designed to remedy the negative

effects of the Black Codes on blacks' property, labor, parenting, and marital
rights). See also MAJOR PROBLEMS

IN THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION

311
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Man 's Most Dangerous Myth: The Fallacyof Race, anthropologist
Ashley Montagu demonstrated through sociological, genetic, and
biological study that "race" is purely a social construct. 14 3 Writing

the introduction to the Sixth Edition in 1997, Dr. Montagu
emphasized that "there is no such thing in reality as 'race'

. .

. the

idea of 'race,' implying the existence of significant biologically
determined mental differences rendering some populations inferior
to others is wholly false.'" 44 He went on to note that the "structure
of the current conception of 'race' to which most people
subscribe"-physical appearance, intelligence, and ability to
"achieve a high civilization"-could not be more "unsound, for
there is no
45 genetic linkage whatever between these three
variables. ,1
Since it is not "race" itself but the disadvantages often
connected with "race" that necessitate remedial measures, modem
affirmative action plans should also target the true source of an
disadvantaged
need for equal protection:
individual's
circumstances, not skin color. Historically, affirmative action went
beyond simply forbidding race discrimination and instead awarded
race-based preferences to redress the lingering disadvantageous
effects of discrimination. Fortunately, in today's society one's race
is no longer wholly determinative of disadvantage, so race-based
programs no longer accurately reflect a need for affirmative action.
Educational affirmative action is no exception. Due to positive
correlations between race and disadvantage that still persist,
disadvantage-based preferential student assignments will produce
racial integration and thus the educational and socialization
benefits of racial diversity. However, disadvantage-based plans
enable school districts to avoid the over-inclusive and underinclusive preferences that characterize race-based affirmative
action.

(Michael Perman ed., Houghton Mifflin Co. 2d ed. 1998) (discussing Congress'
Reconstruction terms, including the Fourteenth Amendment, which were drafted
in part because "the freed slaves had to be protected and given the opportunity to
enjoy and solidify their new status. This meant guaranteeing their legal rights
and economic security, perhaps even giving them the vote or land.").
143. ASHLEY MONTAGU, MAN'S MOST DANGEROUS MYTH: THE FALLACY
OF RACE 31 (AltaMira 6th ed. 1997) (1942).

144. Id.
145. Id.
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a. CorrelationsBetween Race and DisadvantageProduce
Integration
If student assignment plans tracked some combination of
disadvantage indicators, a race-neutral plan would necessarily
provide preferences to significant numbers of African-American
students. U.S. Census data from 2006 indicates that the median
income of white families is $62,712, compared to $38,385 for
black families. 146 Moreover, 18.4% of black households with
children under eighteen are single-parent homes headed by a
female, while only 5.5% of white households are similarly
situated. 147 As for education level, 18% of whites over twenty-five
have a bachelor's degree and 10.5% have a graduate or
professional degree, compared to 11.2% and 5.7% of blacks
respectively. 148
This data supports the findings of recent studies. For example,
the Southern Education Foundation recently reported that lowincome students now constitute 54% of the South's public
schoolchildren; the study attributed this in part to a "higher rate of
population growth among Latino and African-American children,
who are statistically more likely than white children to be born into
a low income household." 14V Additionally, Carl Bankston and
Stephen Caldas' 2002 report on Louisiana school desegregation
noted that "[b]lack Americans as a group grow up in lower-income
families and communities than white Americans do" and "[f]ow
income... means that black American young people have parents
with less educational experience."' 150 Also, "[b]lack children are far
more likely than whites to live in single-parent homes, most often
headed by women."151 The authors emphasize that low income,
poor family educational background, and single-parent families put
minorities at risk for low academic achievement and are also
related to increased occurrences of behavioral and emotional
problems. 152 Additionally, other authorities link race and
146. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2006 AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY,
http://factfinder.census.gov (follow "Data Sets" link; then follow "American
Community Survey" link; then follow "Selected Population Profiles" link; then
select "Add"; then select "Next"; then select "White Alone" or "Black Alone").
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. S. EDUC. FOUND., A NEW MAJORiTY: Low INCOME STUDENTS IN THE
SOUTH'S PUBLIC SCHOOLS 8-10 (2007).
150. CARL L. BANKSTON III & STEPHEN J. CALDAS, A TROUBLED DREAM:
THE PROMISE AND FAILURE OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN LOUISIANA

(2002).
151. Id.
152. Id.
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disadvantage through factors like rate of employment, longevity,
crime victimization, and political representation,1 53 while still
others cite national data showing that African-Americans and
Latino students are disproportionately poorer and that poverty
leads to frequent housing changes and resultant educational
instability, sickness, and higher incidence of violence, alcoholism,
abuse, divorce, and desertion.' 54 These correlations demonstrate
that disproportionate numbers of African-American students and
other minorities would receive preferences under disadvantagebased, race-neutral assignment plans. Consequently, such plans
will necessarily produce integration without resort to raceconscious measures.
The diversity benefits of a race-neutral, disadvantage-based
preference program have already been noted in the university
context. Writing pre-Grutterand pre-ParentsInvolved, one author
explained that a law school's race-neutral admissions policy
enabled the school to enroll "minorities based on non-race factors,
such as overcoming economic and educational disadvantages...
[and] continue to provide a diverse educational environment
without the possibility of encountering reverse discrimination
lawsuits."' 55 The preference program was available to
disadvantaged applicants regardless of race, and disadvantagebased factors allowed the school to "target applicants with certain
backgrounds that are usually associated with minorities. 156
Summing up the compatibility of race-neutral student admissions
plans with the Constitution's Equal Protection Clause, the author
stated that the program "places all applicants, regardless of race,
who have excelled in disadvantageous environments on equal
footing with all applicants, regardless of race, who have excelled in
an advantageous environment. This ...does nothing more than
preserve the equality of157all individuals, as guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment."'
b. Race-NeutralPlans More Accurately Award Preferences
Despite correlations between minority groups and disadvantage,
student assignment plans awarding preferences based purely on race
153. Clark D. Cunningham & N.R. Madhava Menon, Correspondence, Race,
Class, Caste... ? Rethinking Affirmative Action, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1296, 1301
(1999) (citing Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle,92 MICH. L. REV. 2410,
2429,2444-49 (1994)).
154. ORFIELD, supra note 20, at 54.
155. Cereste, supra note 55, at 594-95.
156. Id.at 598.
157. Id.at 600.
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present the twin dangers of over-including or unjustly excluding
students. While race can be an indicator of socioeconomic status
(SES), it is not a perfect test; to be sure, some white students suffer
from disadvantaged backgrounds, and some black students do
not.158 Interestingly, the problem of over-inclusion was addressed
by the nation of India in repairing the effects of its historic caste
system, 159 as discussed in a critique of one author's American
affirmative action recommendations informed by comparison to
India's experience. Professors Clark Cunningham and Madhava
Menon pointed out that, while the author's approach "assume[d]
that evidence of low socioeconomic status of a person's ascribed
group . . . is sufficient to demonstrate that person's own
disadvantage," the Indian Supreme Court recognized "that
reservations [were] going to persons who do not in fact need them
because they have been raised in privileged circumstances due to
parental success in overcoming the disadvantaged status of a
backward group."'1 60 As a solution, the Indian Supreme Court
further differentiated within
161 the beneficiary groups when assigning
preferences.
group-based
While India's group-focused solution primarily addressed the
problem of over-including non-disadvantaged individuals in
preferential programs, a disadvantage-based plan that ignores a
student's particular racial group can also alleviate under-inclusion.
The Louisiana Department of Education's Public Student Counts
and Percentages data helps demonstrate the dual advantagesaccurate inclusion and integration--of a disadvantage-based
student assignment plan. 162 Of the 334,673 Caucasian students in
Louisiana, 143,691, or approximately 43%, are students of low
socioeconomic status (i.e., eligible for free and reduced price
lunch). 163 Of the 289,109 African-American students, 245,109, or
158. BANKSTON & CALDAS, supranote 150, at 9.
159. Cunningham & Menon, supra note 153, at 5.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. LA. DEP'T OF EDUC., MULTIPLE STATISTICS FOR TOTAL REPORTED
PUBLIC SCHOOL STUDENTS (Feb. 2007), http://www.doe.state.la.us/lde/uploads/
10528.xls.
163. Low-income students are determined by their eligibility for free and
reduced price lunch. The National School Lunch Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1751 (2000),
provides federal funding for free and reduced price lunches made available to
eligible school children. Pursuant to §§ 1758(b)(1) and 1766(c)(4), the Department
of Agriculture annually issues Income Eligibility Guidelines for these lunches, and
eligibility is based upon federal income poverty guidelines. See Notices, 72 Fed.
Reg. 8685 (Feb. 27, 2007). Accordingly, applications for free and reduced price
lunch require parents or guardians to submit their total household gross income.
See U.S. Dep't of Agric., Food and Nutrition Service, Free and Reduced Price
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approximately 85%, are low SES. A preferential student
assignment plan based on race would exclude the 43% of white
students whose family income level places them at risk for poor
academic achievement and other problems, while the 15% of black
students who are not low income would remain eligible. However,
a disadvantage-based plan would provide educational opportunities
to both needy white and black children and would still result in
significant integration, since low SES black students almost double
the number of similarly situated whites.
2. The Legal and PracticalSuccess of Race-NeutralPolicies
Requires Careful Planning
If disadvantage-based preferences are to achieve the
aforementioned benefits, a student assignment plan must overcome
two potential legal and practical hurdles. Though ParentsInvolved
clearly supports race-neutral integration plans, an improperly
drawn program could prompt the Court to find that a school
district's disadvantage-based assignment policy is merely a "sham"
for racial balancing. Moreover, race-neutral plans that survive
constitutional challenge still face the practical impediment of highSES student flight from the school district, an obstacle common to
race-based student assignments as well. Awareness of these
possible difficulties can help school districts craft effective raceneutral plans and capitalize upon the legal and educational benefits
of a disadvantage-based approach.
a. Avoiding the "Smokescreen" Challenge
In Grutter, Justice Kennedy joined Justice Rehnquist's dissent,
which argued that the law school's goal to enroll a "critical mass"
of racial minorities was a "sham" to disguise racial balancing
rather than an effort toward broad student body diversity.164 Justice
Kennedy's separate dissent called the school's plan "a delusion...
to mask its attempt to make race an automatic factor in most
instances and to achieve numerical goals indistinguishable from
quotas." 165 Since Justice Kennedy's swing vote can determine the

and
Verification
Forms,
http://www.
Lunch
Application
fns.usda.gov/cnd/Application/2006_Application.doc. School districts that have
gathered this data pursuant to federal law also use the information to calculate
percentages of low-socioeconomic status students in the district.
164. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 383 (2003).
165. Id.at 389.
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constitutionality of a district's assignment plan and he has shown
suspicion of schools' methodologies, a district cannot confuse the
integration benefits of a disadvantage-based plan with a singular
purpose of allotting preferences to a specified number of AfricanAmerican students. Nevertheless, two considerations preserve
race-neutral student assignment plans as the best option for school
districts.
First, a disadvantage-based plan that recognizes significant
racial integration as one benefit and utilizes a variety of
disadvantage indicators instead of "crude"' 166 race typing should
satisfy Justice Kennedy. In Parents Involved, Justice Kennedy
indicated that he approves facially race-neutral measures designed
to encourage diverse student body compositions, even though
some element of race-consciousness is present.' 67 He went on to
list strategic school site selection, attendance zones, resource
allocation, and targeted recruitment as examples of race-conscious
yet permissible actions to achieve diversity. " Justice Kennedy left
schools "free to devise race-conscious measures" to foster
integration; 169 such measures might include preferences for
disadvantaged children using indicators like family income level,
parents' educational background, family structure (single-parent
households and number and age of siblings), contact with the
criminal justice system (a parent has been lost to the penal system
or the student has a personal criminal history), and past academic
performance as indicated by test scores.
Second, because a race-neutral student assignment plan does
not employ suspect race classifications on its face, a petitioner
challenging the plan will bear the burden of demonstrating that the
district's plan is really a "smokescreen" for racial balancing.
Facially race-neutral plans are subject to deferential rational basis
review. For strict scrutiny to apply, a plaintiff claiming that
facially-neutral state action is impermissibly discriminatory must
intent, not merely a
prove the government's discriminatory
"racially disproportionate impact."' 7 0 Thus, as long as school
districts utilize race-neutral plans to ensure that all disadvantaged
students, regardless of race, have access to their school
preferences, the fact that more African-American than white
166. Id.
167. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct.
2738, 2792 (2007).
168. Id.

169. Id.
170. Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). See
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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students qualify for those preferences should not invalidate the
student assignment plan.
b. Combating "Flight"
and voluntary
desegregation
Although court-ordered
affirmative action plans both attempt to achieve integration,
increased segregation often occurs instead,' 7 1 and disadvantagebased plans are not exempt from this problem. As of 2003, the
percentage of white students attending school with the average
black student had dropped to at or near 1970 levels in many states.
In Louisiana in 2003, the average black student attended school with
less white students than he or she did in 1970.172 In Louisiana, this
trend has been attributed to "white flight" into suburban school
73
districts or private schools following court-ordered desegregation. 1
White flight in turn is largely a reaction to diminished overall
academic performance of the student body caused by increased
concentrations of at-risk black students in traditionally white
schools. Bankston and Caldas documented this diminished
academic performance, finding that both black and white tenth
graders' percentage of correct answers on the 1990 Louisiana
Graduate Exit Exam decreased correspondingly with increases in
their school's concentration of African-American students
impoverished students, and students from single-parent families.17V
Though Parents Involved clearly supports the constitutionality
of a race-neutral assignment plan, a preference plan creating
increased concentrations of disadvantaged students per school
must accommodate negative effects on academic performance and
resulting white flight in order to achieve the benefits of integration
171.

See ORFIELD, supra note 20.

172. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2838 (citing G. ORFIELD & C. LEE,
RACIAL TRANSFORMATION AND THE CHANGING NATURE OF SEGREGATION 18

tbl. 8 (2006)).
173. BANKSTON & CALDAS, supra note 150, at 65 tbls. 3.2, 3.3; id. at 89 fig.
4.2; id. at 112 fig. 5.1; id. at 113 tbl. 5.1; id. at 152 fig. 6.2; id. at 153 fig. 6.3; id.
at 164 fig. 6.4; id. at 169 fig. 6.5; id. at 181 fig. 6.8.
174. Id. at 193 tbl.7.1;id. at 195 tbl. 7.2; id. at 197 tbl. 7.4.
In theory, there is no reason that a majority-black school cannot be far
superior to a majority-white school .... [F]or the most part, though,
the association between the proportion of African American students
and the propoition of at-risk students is so close that efforts to seek
good schools and avoid bad schools mean efforts to avoid schools with
concentrations of black students. Desegregation, then, bears its own
self-contradiction. The very inequalities that lead policy makers to try
to achieve racial balances in schools promote imbalances.
Id. at 11.
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and access to enhanced educational opportunities. Bankston and
Caldas summarize the issue:
[W]e now know that beyond a certain threshold percentage
of African American (which statistics show translates to a
high concentration of children from single-parent, poor
families) both whites and blacks with the financial means
are likely to pull their children from such schools ... the
challenge will be to [integrate] . . . in a manner that does
that will trigger white flight-and
not surpass a threshold 175
higher-SES black flight.
Thus, while Parents Involved does not impose constitutional
barriers to race-neutral assignment plans, schools utilizing
disadvantage-based preferences must recognize and address
practical barriers-such as high-SES176white and black flight-that
have long plagued race-based plans.
C. Parents Involved's CurrentImpact in Louisiana is Limited
The race-conscious and race-neutral student assignment
options remaining after Parents Involved belie alarmists' calls that
integration is no more. But even if Justice Breyer and some
commentators' end-of-integration predictions following Parents
Involved were accurate, the ruling's immediate effects, particularly
in Louisiana, would be constrained by the racial demographics,
overall population size, legal status, and current assignment plans
of some school districts.
As of February 2007, nine school districts in Louisiana had
minority student populations of over 80%, 17 7 rendering significant
integration within the district largely impossible whether raceconscious or race-neutral student assignment plans are utilized. In
their Louisiana study, Bankston and Caldas highlight three
Louisiana parishes--Orleans, East Baton Rouge, and Lafayettewhere court-ordered desegregation produced such high rates of
white flight that the public school systems are either almost
entirely made up of African-American students or steadily
175. Id. at 204.
176. The complexities of "white flight" are beyond the scope of this Note.
Specific solutions to the problem are largely dependent upon the particular
circumstances of individual school districts, but for an introduction to "white
flight" in Louisiana, see BANKSTON & CALDAS, supra note 150.
177. LA. DEP'T OF EDUC., supra note 162. These districts include: East Baton
Rouge, 83.93%; East Carroll, 94.15%; Madison, 92.25%; Orleans, 84.66%; St.
Helena, 94.46%; St. John the Baptist, 82.34%; Tensas, 94.20%; Monroe City,
87.93%; City of Baker, 92.62%. Id.
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approaching that result. 178 For these districts, significant
integration can likely come only as a result of measures designed
to re-attract white students 79lost to private schools, suburban
districts, or home-schooling. 1
On the other hand, some districts' small student population can
result in integration by default. For example, the City of Baker,
Bogalusa City, Red River, and West Feliciana school districts
operate only one school for each grade, while Madison Parish has
only one high school and one middle school. 180 This set-up
requires students of the same grade, regardless of race, to attend
school together. Thus, in addition to the race-conscious and raceneutral assignment plans still viable after Parents Involved,
consolidated schools 181
may be a legitimate integration option for
small school districts.
In addition to district circumstances that might render
integration moot, the present legal status of some Louisiana
schools limits the immediate application of Parents Involved. Of
the seventy school districts in Louisiana, forty-three are still
subject to court-ordered desegregation. 182 ParentsInvolved clearly
reaffirms that race classifications are constitutionally permissible
178. BANKSTON & CALDAS, supra note 150, at 68.
179. Id. at 204. The authors' recommendations include educational,
economic, and social policies. They suggest neighborhood school programs with
increased spending and teacher salary incentives in minority schools, combined
with magnet programs whose enhanced resources keep whites interested in the
public schools and create a higher learning environment for talented blacks. The
authors also encourage residential desegregation through the elimination of
housing discrimination, as well as economic development of minority
communities through public transportation, incentives for job-creating
investments, and public works performed by a government-jobs agency similar
to the Depression-era's Works Progress Administration or Tennessee Valley
Authority. Finally, the authors emphasize public policies designed to aid singleparent families, incentives to encourage two-parent households, and religious
promotion of fatherhood and strong family structures. Id. at 205-19.
180. See Appendix. The author gathered data from Louisiana school districts
through email surveys and telephone calls. All seventy school districts
responded to part or all of the data request. School district representatives were
asked to provide the district's current desegregation status (i.e., never under
court order, currently under court order, or unitary), the name of the court case
and presiding judge if currently under court order or unitary, the date of court
order if any, the date of unitary status if any, and a description of the district's
current student assignment plan.
181. However, small districts with disproportionately large populations of
one racial group would still face integration obstacles despite consolidated
schools. For example, Madison Parish and City of Baker have over 90%
minority populations. See LA. DEP'T OF EDUC., supra note 162.
182. See Appendix. See also U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 33,
at 141-44.

2008]

NOTES

249

for remedial purposes, namely correcting the effects of de jure
segregation, 183 so these districts' student assignment plans are not
currently affected by the Court's ruling. Of course, Parents
Involved will guide these districts' future assignment policies when
and if each achieves unitary status.
Of the remaining Louisiana districts, sixteen have achieved
unitary status, while eleven were never found legally segregated
and placed under judicial supervision.184 ParentsInvolved governs
these twenty-seven districts, and they report varying student
assignment plans. 185 Most of these districts primarily operate
neighborhood schools according to student residence and do not
consider race in making assignments. 86 These districts thus have
no level of legal risk under Parents Involved, though the opinion
would certainly support both race-conscious and race-neutral
measures designed to87 achieve integration should these districts
identify such a need. 1

183. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct.
2738,2752, 2771 (2007).
184. See Appendix. See also U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 33,
at 139-40, 145. The Commission's report only reflects nine unitary districts, and
the report does not include the recently-formed Central Community and Orleans
Recovery school districts.
185. Many of these districts operate neighborhood schools, with some plans
allow magnet program transfers, majority-to-minority transfers, hardship
transfers, academic transfers, and transfers by persons providing their own
transportation. Some unitary districts are still using court-approved attendance
zones, many of which were no doubt "gerrymandered" based upon racial
considerations. See Appendix. However, Justice Kennedy's concurrence
explicitly noted that racially-conscious attendance zones are sufficiently
narrowly tailored to achieve racial diversity, so a majority of the Court would
not overturn such assignment plans. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2792
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
186. See Appendix.
187. Despite the limitations that might render racial diversity difficult to
achieve in Louisiana, federal and state legislation is in place to counter
educational inequality. For example, school systems nationwide must report
disaggregated test scores (i.e., separately report test scores by race) to ensure
that minority academic results do not get lost in the shuffle of a school district's
overall academic performance. See No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L.
No. 107-110, § 1111, 115 Stat. 1451 (2002). In keeping with federal
requirements, Louisiana has also adopted state reporting requirements for
"Adequate Yearly Progress" that ensure that each subgroup's performance
(including minority groups) is evaluated separately. See LA. ADMIN. CODE tit.
28, § 4310 (2007).
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V. CONCLUSION

When Chief Justice Roberts began the Parents Involved
opinion, he asked "whether a public school that had not operated
legally segregated schools or has been found to be unitary may
choose to classify students by race and rely upon that classification
in making school assignments.' 88 The short answer to that
question is "No, but. .. ."
While the plurality and Justice Kennedy reject pure race typing
through individual classifications, a majority of the Court has not
outlawed a more narrowly tailored use of race to achieve the
educational and social benefits of racial diversity in the nation's
public elementary and secondary schools. More importantly, raceneutral, disadvantage-based student assignment plans can
accomplish racial diversity without the stricter constitutional
review, reverse discrimination challenges, and over- and underinclusive preferences that characterize race-based plans.
Furthermore, school districts employing race-neutral plans will
likely garner the approval of the Parents Involved plurality and
thus the full support of the Court. If, as Justice Breyer indicates,
the promise of Brown is a "democracy that must work for all
Americans ... one law, one Nation, one people, not simply as189a
matter of legal principle but in terms of how we actually live,"'
Parents Involved may hold the key to a level of fulfillment of
Brown that has never before occurred: schools that strive to meet
the needs of all children regardless of their race.
Michelle Renee Shamblin*

188. ParentsInvolved, 127 S. Ct. at 2746.
189. Id. at 2836 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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VI. APPENDIX
A. DesegregationStatus ofLouisianaPublic School Districts
1. DistrictsCurrently Under Court Order(43)
Avoyelles
Bienville
Bogalusa City
Bossier
Caddo
Calcasieu
Caldwell
Catahoula
Claiborne
Concordia
Desoto

East Carroll
East Feliciana
Evangeline
Franklin
Jackson
Jefferson
Jefferson Davis
Lafourche
Lasalle
Lincoln
Madison

Monroe City
Morehouse
Natchitoches
Orleans
Ouachita
Plaquemines
Pointe Coupee
Richland
Sabine
St. Helena
St. James

St. John
St. Landry
St. Tammany
Tangipahoa
Terrebonne
Union
Washington
Webster
West Baton Rouge
West Carroll

2. DistrictsDeclaredUnitary (16)
Acadia
Ascension
E. Baton Rouge
Grant

Iberia
Iberville
Lafayette
Livingston

Rapides
Red River
St. Bernard
St. Martin

St. Mary
Tensas
Vermillion
West Feliciana

3. DistrictsNever Under Court Order (11)
Allen
Assumption
Baker City

Beauregard
Cameron
Central Comm.

Orleans Recovery Winn
St. Charles
Zachary
Vernon

B. Student Assignment Plans of LouisianaPublicSchool Districts
(52 districtsresponding)
District

Status

Acadia

Unitary

Allen
Ascension
Assumption
Avoyelles
Baker City

No Court Order
Unitary
No Court Order
Court Order
No Court Order

I

I__

Plan
Neighborhood Schools, One School
Per Grade Level Grouping*
No Response
Neighborhood Schools
No Response
Court-Approved Attendance Zones
One School Per Grade Level
IGrouping
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Beauregard

No Court Order

Bienville
Bogalusa City

Court Order
Court Order

Bossier

Court Order

Caddo

Court Order

Calcasieu

Court Order

Caldwell
Cameron

Court Order
No Court Order

Catahoula
Central Community
Claiborne

Court Order
No Court Order
Court Order

Concordia
Desoto
East Baton Rouge

Court Order
Court Order
Unitary

East Carroll
East Feliciana

Court Order
Court Order

Evangeline

Court Order

Franklin
Grant
Iberia

Court Order
Unitary
Unitary

Iberville
Jackson

Unitary
Court Order

Jefferson
Jefferson Davis
Lafayette

Court Order
Court Order
Unitary
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Neighborhood Schools, MajorityMinority Transfers
Neighborhood Schools
One School Per Grade Level
Grouping
Neighborhood Schools, MajorityMinority Transfers
Court-Approved Attendance Zones,
Majority-Minority Transfers, Magnet
Programs
Neighborhood Schools, MajorityMinority Transfers
Court-Approved Attendance Zones
Neighborhood Schools, Open
Enrollment with Student-Provided
Transportation
Court-Approved Attendance Zones
No Response
Court-Approved Attendance Zones,
Majority-Minority Transfers
No Response
Court-Approved Attendance Zones
Neighborhood Schools, Magnet
Programs
Court-Approved Attendance Zones
Court-Approved Attendance Zones,
Majority-Minority Transfers
Voluntary/Involuntary Student and
Personnel Transfers to Reflect
District-Wide Race Percentages in
Each School
Court-Approved Attendance Zones
Court-Approved Attendance Zones
Neighborhood Schools, Other
Transfers**
No Response
Court-Approved Attendance Zones,
Majority-Minority Transfers, Other
Transfers
Court-Approved Attendance Zones
Court-Approved Attendance Zones
Neighborhood Schools, MajorityMinority Transfers, Other Transfers
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Lafourche
Lasalle

Court Order
Court Order

Neighborhood Schools
Neighborhood Schools

Lincoln

Court Order

Livingston

Unitary

Madison

Court Order

Monroe City

Court Order

Morehouse

Court Order

Natchitoches
Orleans
Orleans Recovery
Ouachita
Plaquemines
Pointe Coupee
Rapides

Court Order
Court Order
No Court Order
Court Order
Court Order
Court Order
Unitary

Red River

Unitary

Richland

Court Order

Sabine

Court Order

St. Bernard
St. Charles

Unitary
No Court Order

St. Helena
St. James
St. John

Court Order
Court Order
Court Order

St. Landry

Court Order

St. Martin
St. Mary
St. Tammany

Unitary
Unitary
Court Order

Court-Approved Attendance Zones,
Majority-Minority Transfers, Other
Transfers
Court-Approved Attendance Zones,
Other Transfers
One School Per Grade Level
Grouping
Court-Approved Attendance Zones,
Magnet Programs
Court-Approved Attendance Zones,
Majority-Minority Transfers, Other
Transfers
No Response
No Response
No Response
No Response
No Response
No Response
Neighborhood Schools, Magnet
Programs
One School Per Grade Level
Grouping
Court-Approved Attendance Zones,
Majority-Minority Transfers
Court-Approved Attendance Zones,
Majority-Minority Transfers, Other
Transfers
Neighborhood Schools
Neighborhood Schools, Other
Transfers
No Response
No Response
Court-Approved Attendance Zones,
Magnet Programs
Court-Approved Attendance Zones,
Majority-Minority Transfers, Other
Transfers
No Response
Neighborhood Schools
No Response
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Tangipahoa

Court Order

Tensas

Unitary

Terrebonne
Union

Court Order
Court Order

Vermillion

Unitary

Vernon

No Court Order

Washington
Webster
West Baton Rouge
West Carroll

Court Order
Court Order
Court Order
Court Order

West Feliciana

Unitary

Winn
Zachary

No Court Order
No Court Order
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Court-Approved Attendance Zones,
Majority-Minority Transfers
Court-Approved Attendance Zones,
Other Transfers
No Response
Court-Approved Attendance Zones,
Majority-Minority Transfers, Other
Transfers
Court-Approved Attendance Zones,
Other Transfers
Court-Approved Attendance Zones,
Open Enrollment with StudentProvided Transportation
Court-Approved Attendance Zones
Court-Approved Attendance Zones
No Response
Court-Approved Attendance Zones,
Majority-Minority Transfers, Other
Transfers
One School Per Grade Level
Grouping
No Response
No Response

* District uses neighborhood schools in outlying areas and
one school per grade grouping in city schools.
** Other transfers include any combination of academic,
medical, athletic, parent-employee, other hardship, or lottery
transfers.

